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Consortium: Correcting California's
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By GARY JOHNSTON, JR.*
Were we to rule upon precedent alone, were stability the only rea-
son for our being, we would have no trouble [denying loss of con-
sortium to a wife]. We would simply tell the woman to begone, and
to take her shattered husband with her .... In so doing we would
have vast support from the dusty books. But dust the decision
would remain in our mouths through the years ahead, a reproach
to law and conscience alike. Our oath is do justice, not to perpetu-
ate error.'
MR. MOONEY LOST control of his sport-utility vehicle as he ap-
proached the intersection of Mission Street and Twenty-First Street in
San Francisco. Three cars were stopped at the intersection, each with
its own couple inside. Kurt and Goldie, in the left lane, were a com-
mitted couple who had been together and monogamous for eight
years and were not planning on marrying. Barbra and James, in the
middle lane, were a committed married couple who had been married
for two years. Stanford and Marcus, in the right lane, were a commit-
ted gay couple who had been together and monogamous for five years
and do not plan on registering as domestic partners. Mr. Mooney has
a brief moment of swerving one way or the other, but he will crash
into one of the vehicles at the intersection and injure one person in
whichever car he hits. Which couple will it be?
In California, Mr. Mooney would be in the best position, legally
and thus financially, if he were to crash into Kurt and Goldie or Stan-
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1. Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich. 1960).
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ford and Marcus. Why? If Mr. Mooney were to crash into either of the
unmarried couples, the uninjured companion would be prevented
from claiming loss of consortium despite the fact that one member of
the couple could be physically injured and incapable of providing sex-
ual relations, companionship, and conjugal support. Were Mr.
Mooney to crash into Barbra andJames, the married couple, the unin-
jured spouse would be able to bring a claim for his or her loss of
conjugal support.
As odd or unfair as this incongruity may seem, this situation is the
current reality in California. In Part I, this Comment will discuss loss
of consortium in general and the tort's specific developments with
respect to California. Part II will introduce New Mexico's abolishment
of the requirement of marriage for recovery and will discuss why Cali-
fornia must rework its requirements for a loss of consortium claim in
order to conform to prevailing societal interests.
I. Development of the Loss of Consortium Claim
A. History and Defimition
Loss of consortium as a cause of action is a relatively recent devel-
opment in state tort law.2 Due to its modern history and its continually
changing standard, many legal practitioners know little about this
amorphous cause of action, its origin, or its complexities.3 Arguably,
the problem of loss of consortium in the United States arose primarily
from the inability of courts to define what the term meant in a mod-
ern society and their attempts to reconcile the tort with the history of
the claim at common law. No exacting definition of loss of consortium
has ever been commonly accepted by all state jurisdictions.4 Despite
its fluid definition, loss of consortium flows from conduct of a
tortfeasor that creates one mate's physical injury resulting in some in-
tangible loss to the other mate.5 Today, loss of consortium is the cause
of action whereby an uninjured spouse may seek compensation for
intangible loss sustained as a result of his or her spouse's injury, in-
cluding the lost support, services, love, companionship, comfort, af-
2. California, for example, did not allow loss of consortium as a cause of action in
any form until 1960. See West v. City of San Diego, 353 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1960).
3. See generally Nancy C. Osborne, Comment, Loss of Consortium: Paradise Lost, Paradise
Regained, 15 CuMB. L. REv. 179 (1985).
4. Id. at 180.
5. Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 843 (N.M. 1994).
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fection, society, sexual relations, moral support, and deprivation of a
spouse's physical help with housework.6
Historically, only a husband could claim the right to loss of con-
sortium based on a proprietary interest-namely, injury to his prop-
erty.7 At the time, courts considered a wife the property of her
husband and her injury an economic detriment to him." A gradual
shift, primarily during the 1970s, occurred when courts began al-
lowing wives to bring loss of consortium claims. This shift transformed
the interest at stake from a proprietary and economic interest to a
relational interest, where the relationship between the adult couple
was what was most important.9 Courts realized that the loss of intangi-
ble benefits, such as emotional support, solace, and sexual relations,
should be permitted to be claimed by both husband and wife. 10
Tort principles allowed much flexibility when state courts dealt
with loss of consortium, primarily because "the cause of action for loss
of consortium is judge-made law."11 When no statute could be found
to guide the court, it looked to the principles of common law to ex-
tend the right or to deny its extension. 12 In extending the right for
wives to recover, one court stated that such "obstacles to the wife's
action were judge-created and they are herewith judge-destroyed."' 3
The United States Supreme Court also recognized long ago that the
common law was adaptable; its "flexibility and capacity for growth and
adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law."14
Most state legislatures have remained relatively passive with this
cause of action, leaving the courts to regulate the claim as common
law. 15 Many courts did not wait for legislatures to act, nor could they
6. Ledger v. Tippitt, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by Elden v.
Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
7. See Osborne, supra note 3, at 183-84.
8. Id.
9. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (extending the
claim for loss of consortium to wives for the first time in American legal history), overruled
in part by Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974) (extending the claim for loss of consortium to wives
in California).
10. See Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897, 899 (N.Y. 1968).
11. Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), overruled
by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
12. See Mo. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 299 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Ark. 1957).
13. Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227, 235 (Mich. 1960).
14. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884).
15. Only a few states have legislation allowing wives, as well as husbands, to recover for
loss of consortium. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-205 (1995); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West
1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 302 (West 2003); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-1 (2001);
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rely upon antiquated common law standards that denied the wife
recovery.
We find no wisdom in abdicating to the legislature our essential
function of re-evaluating commonlaw [sic] concepts in light of pre-
sent day realities. Nor do we find judicial sagacity in continually
looking backward and parroting the words and analyses of other
courts so as to embalm for posterity the legal concepts of the
past.16
Thus, many courts extended the wife's right to recover for loss of con-
sortium through common law. 17
B. History of California's Loss of Consortium Claim
In California, loss of consortium remains a common law claim.,
In 1960, the California Supreme Court first decided that the state
would recognize a husband's claim for loss of consortium. 19 Fourteen
years later, the California Supreme Court in Rodriquez v. Bethlelm Steel
Corporation20 altered its common law understanding of the loss of con-
sortium claim by including a wife's recovery. 21 The court justified its
shift by discussing the nationwide trend of allowing women to re-
cover. 22 It explained that the change in common law and in society
overall required the court to use reason and equity to alter the loss of
consortium claim to conform to society's understanding of a woman's
role and her equal status.23 The Rodrig-uez court24 impliedly relied on
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 214 (West 2001); OR. REv. STAT. § 108.010 (2003); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-75-20 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 25-1-106 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 5431 (1995); W. VA. CODE § 48-29-302 (2001).
16. Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (111. 1960) (allowing wives to recover for loss
of consortium despite precedent in common law).
17. See Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); City of Glendale v. Bradshaw,
503 P.2d 803 (Ariz. 1972); Mo. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 299 S.W.2d 41 (Ark. 1957);
Yonner v. Adams, 167 A.2d 717 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
1971); Dini, 170 N.E.2d 881; Troue v. Marker, 252 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1969); Acuff v. Schmit,
78 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1956); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); Montgomery v.
Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1960); Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d 865
(Minn. 1969); Whitney v. Fisher, 417 A.2d 934 (Vt. 1980).
18. See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 675 (Cal. 1974) (extending
the claim for loss of consortium to wives in California); Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582,
588 (Cal. 1988) (denying unmarried cohabitants recovery for loss of consortium).
19. West v. City of San Diego, 353 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1960).
20. 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974).
21. Id. at 675.
22. Id. at 673-75.
23. Id. at 675-79.
24. Id.
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the reasoning of a previous Florida Supreme Court decision, 25 which
stated:
[Some may contend that we are failing to remain blindly loyal to
the doctrine of stare decisis. However, we must recognize that the
law is not static. The great body of our laws is the product of pro-
gressive thinking which attunes traditional concepts to the needs
and demands of changing times.26
The Rodriguez court reasoned that a wife's claim was not too diffi-
cult to assume, given the fact that an injured person could easily be
married and, therefore, that his or her spouse would "be adversely
affected by that injury."27 Furthermore, according to the court, the
detriment that a wife would encounter from an injured husband de-
mands compensation that could easily be resolved by a jury.28 The
court brushed aside the arguments of overextending liability by stat-
ing that the requirement of a close relationship would preclude unde-
serving individuals from recovery. 29 It also laid down a procedural rule
that squelched the argument that a wife could receive compensation
for something that the injured husband could also claim by stating
that jury instructions, directing award deductions or requiring ajoin-
der of the husband's claims, would prevent such double recovery.30
The progressive ruling in Rodriquez, along with its clearly articu-
lated reasons for allowing an extension for a loss of consortium claim,
caused many plaintiffs to also attempt to bring loss of consortium
claims for extramarital relationships. But in 1977 the California Su-
preme Court ruled that loss of consortium should be "narrowly cir-
cumscribed," 31 reasoning that "somewhere a line must be drawn." 32 It
held that a parent could not claim loss of consortium for the injury of
a child and that a child could not claim loss of consortium for the
injury of a parent.33 With that decision, the California Supreme Court
began to draw a line in the sand.
In 1983 a California appellate court in Butcher v. Superior Court3 4
ruled that a relationship between a man and a woman, who were un-
25. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
26. Id. at 133.
27. Rodriguez, 525 P.2d at 680.
28. Id. at 681-82.
29. Id. at 682-83.
30. Id. at 683-85.
31. Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 860 (Cal. 1977).
32. Id. at 862.
33. Id. at 865.
34. 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582
(Cal. 1988).
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married but thought they were married under the common law,
evinced such a strong and stable relationship that the woman should
recover for loss of consortium.3 5 The appellate court allowed for re-
covery because it found that the cause of action was not based on legal
marriage but rather on "an interference with the continuation of the
relational interest" shared between two committed individuals.3 6 The
court viewed the common law "as an ever-changing malleable body of
law distinguished by its ability to adapt to changing times and issues"
which allowed it to extend the right to unmarried, strong, and stable
couples.37 Losses to companionship, sexual relations, love, and emo-
tional support are, according to the court, just as real to a committed
yet legally unmarried couple as they are to a committed married
couple.38
The court denied that extending the claim would create unend-
ing liability because the requirement of sexual relations would pre-
clude close relationships like sisters, fathers, friends, in-laws, and
colleagues from claiming loss of consortium.3 9 The court would also
consider the duration of the relationship, if the individuals had any
mutual contracts, the degree of economic cooperation, if children
were involved, and the couple's sexual exclusiveness. 40 In essence, the
court made the standard one of committed cohabitation. Cohabitants
in California were defined as unrelated individuals who exhibited
strong relationship factors, such as sexual relations, while living in the
same quarters, sharing incomes and expenses, jointly using the prop-
erty, and exhibiting a relationship of extended length and con-
tinuity.41 With Butcher, only committed cohabitants could recover for
loss of consortium, not just anyone and not just any cohabitant.42
In allowing loss of consortium claims for unmarried cohabitants,
the court, albeit impliedly, relied upon a functional rather than for-
mal definition of a relationship. The functional idea of a relationship
focuses on the quality of the relationship between the individuals and
recognizes that a relationship may operate as a family regardless of the
35. Id.
36. Id. at 506.
37. Id. at 507.
38. Id. at 510-11.
39. Id. at 511.
40. Id. at 512.
41. People v. Holifield, 252 Cal. Rptr. 729, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
42. Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
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tide bequeathed to it.4 3 When the family is viewed as the pillar and
foundation of culture, as the stable provider of emotional and finan-
cial support, as the educator of children, and as the setting for procre-
ative activity, it becomes clear that the functional "essence" of a family
is found beyond the traditionally and narrowly confined formal defini-
tion of family. 44 Functional families and relationships, though not le-
gally sanctioned or necessarily protected, may be considered
equivalent to that of a traditional nuclear family.45 Those involved in
functional relationships experience the same emotions and fulfill the
same human needs as those who participate in formally defined fami-
lies.46 Though this may appear to be a recent definition for family, the
California Supreme Court has recognized both formal and functional
family definitions since 1921. For example, while determining the
purpose of an insurance clause concerning the family, it stated that
the family "may be a particular group of people related by blood or
marriage, or not related at all, who are living together in the intimate and
mutual interdependence of a single home or household."47
C. Elden v. Sheldorn48 California's Current Loss of
Consortium Law
The shift in loss of consortium claims from proprietary interest to
relational interest was lauded by most courts as conforming to the cur-
rent paradigms and social advancements of the 1960s and 1970s. 49 In
California, during the mid-1980s, unmarried cohabitants had persua-
sive authority allowing them to claim loss of consortium. 50 California
at that time was the only state, through judicial action, to allow an
unmarried cohabitant to claim loss of consortium. During the 1980s
there were also two federal cases allowing unmarried persons to re-
43. See Laura M. Raisty, Note, Bystander Distress and Loss of Consortium: An Examination
of the Relationship Requirement in Light ofRomer v. Evans, 65 FoRDHAm L. REv. 2647, 2661-62
(1997).
44. Comment, Extending Consortium Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants, 129 U. PA. L. REv.
911, 926 (1981).
45. See Sollars v. City of Albuquerque, 794 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D.N.M. 1992).
46. See Raisty, supra note 43, at 2662.
47. Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 196 P. 257, 259 (Cal.
1921) (emphasis added). It is essential not to be pedantic over Moore being an insurance
case and not a loss of consortium case; instead, note that, even in the 1920s, the courts
were willing to see the family as something more than what is "traditional."
48. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
49. See cases cited supra note 17.
50. See Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), overruled by
Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
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cover,5 1 but in both instances the federal judge incorrectly postulated
what the state law would have allowed. Thus, the federal decisions
were invalidated by subsequent state court decisions. 52 Therefore, Cal-
ifornia led the advancement for recovery in the 1980s. With the pro-
gression of cohabitant recovery,53 an implicit fear grew regarding the
increased litigation and the growing numbers of frivolous plaintiffs
attempting to recover for loss of consortium. This concern evidenced
itself in the California Supreme Court's ruling against Richard Elden's
action. 54
In the winter of 1982, passenger Richard Elden and driver Linda
Ebeling were in a car accident caused by the negligent conduct of
Robert Sheldon. 55 Richard sustained serious injuries, and Linda, Rich-
ard's longtime live-in girlfriend, was launched from the wreckage and
died shortly thereafter.56 At the time of the accident, Richard and
Linda were cohabiting and not married. 57 During the ensuing litiga-
tion, Richard argued, inter alia, that he should be able to claim loss of
consortium under the Butcher analysis because his and Linda's rela-
tionship exhibited stable and significant characteristics that paralleled
that of a married couple.58
After dismissing Richard's claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, 59 the California Supreme Court analyzed Richard's loss
of consortium claim. 60 The court overruled Butcher,6 1 holding that
"the right to recover for loss of consortium is founded on the relation-
51. See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980) (interpreting New
Jersey law to include a claim of loss of consortium for unmarried cohabitants); Sutherland
v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (interpreting Penn-
sylvania law to include a claim of loss of consortium to a husband even though he married
the injured woman after she sustained her injury).
52. See Childers v. Shannon, 444 A.2d 1141 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) (declining
to follow prior federal interpretation of New Jersey common law allowing loss of consor-
tium to be claimed by unmarried cohabitants); Rockwell v. Liston, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 756
(Ct. Com. P1. 1975) (declining to follow prior federal interpretation of Pennsylvania com-
mon law by holding that a wife had no cause of action for loss of consortium where the
injury to her husband occurred during the engagement, one month prior to the
marriage).
53. See generally Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 57, 58, 60-65.
55. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 582 (Cal. 1988).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 588.
60. Id. at 588-90.
61. Butcher was the 1983 California appellate case that allowed recovery to an unmar-
ried cohabitant. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
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ship of marriage, and absent such a relationship the right does not
exist."'62 It asserted that the claim was limited and closely circum-
scribed due to its "intangible nature," and due to "the difficulty of
measuring [its] damages."63 The court was particularly cautious of
overextending liability or, as the court phrased it, "the possibility of an
unreasonable increase in the number of persons who would be enti-
tled to sue for the loss." 64 Moreover, the court reasoned that the loss
of consortium claim explicitly excluded unmarried cohabitants due to
the absence of authority to support otherwise, as well as "the state's
interest in promoting the responsibilities of marriage and the diffi-
culty of [evaluating] the emotional, sexual and financial commitment
of cohabiting parties to determine whether [it] was the equivalent of a
marriage. '65 The court dismissed Richard's loss of consortium cause
of action and emphasized that morality played no role in its
decision. 66
In summary, the court used a five part analysis to deny recovery.
It denied recovery because: (1) loss of consortium dealt with the in-
tangible; (2) it was difficult to measure such intangibles; (3) it could
overextend liability to undeserving plaintiffs; (4) there was a state in-
terest in promoting the responsibilities of marriage; and (5) the court
would have difficulty delving into the personal private lives of
cohabitating plaintiffs to see if their relationship was stable and
significant. 67
Beyond circumscribing loss of consortium claims, Elden essen-
tially defined relationships in California. 68 In denying Richard Elden
an action for loss of consortium, the court maintained a formalistic
view of relationships rather than Butcher's functional approach. 69 For
loss of consortium, "marriage is the only relationship... that can give
way to recovery." 70 Factors such as commitment levels and duration
carry no weight in the formal relationship analysis, leaving only formal
ties such as marriage, blood relation, and adoptive relationships. 71 For
California and other states, Elden solidified the formalistic approach to
62. Elden, 758 P.2d at 589.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 590.
67. Id. at 589-90.
68. See Raisty, supra note 43, at 2659.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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relationships as the accepted way of dealing with torts that require a
specific relationship before one may recover.72 Prior to Elden the Cali-
fornia courts seemed to favor a more formal approach to defining
relationships for tort purposes, but it was the Elden court that finally
nailed the tort door shut to functional definitions of relationships in
California. For example, in 1983 the California Supreme Court re-
fused unemployment benefits to a cohabitating couple by emphasiz-
ing the need for courts to draw arbitrary lines and yet keep privacy
intrusions to a minimum-without direct reference to a formal ap-
proach. 73 Likewise, in 1987, a California appellate court denied a sta-
ble and committed homosexual couple recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress without explicitly recognizing its for-
malistic reasoning for prohibiting recovery.74 Elden finally pulled to-
gether all these principles, solidifying the formal definition of
relationships as the standard for relationship-dependent torts, even
though California had, in years past, granted cohabitants many bene-
fits in other areas. 75
II. Eliminating California's Marriage Requirement
The crucial aspect that makes loss of consortium such a trouble-
some and odious cause of action lies in the fact that the "social evolu-
tion of the family has outpaced the legal evolution."76 Society has
permitted a wealth of knowledge about emotional injuries, but the law
in such areas remains stagnant.77 The courts should change the com-
mon law to conform to current societal interests and understanding.
In California, there is a maxim that "[w]hen the reason of a rule
72. See, e.g., Matuz v. Gerardin Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (denying
loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants in California due to a lack of formal relation-
ship based on Elden); Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, 3 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2000)
(denying recovery to an elderly cohabitating couple in Alaska due to a lack of formal rela-
tionship based on Elden).
73. Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 192 Cal. Rptr. 134, 140 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
74. See Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
75. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976) (allowing cohabitants to aggre-
gate income and property in mutual agreements); Dep't of Indus. Relations v. Workers'
Comp. Appeals Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (allowing cohabitants to re-
cover work-related death benefits), overruled in part by At. Richfield Co. v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd., 644 P.2d 1257 (Cal. 1982) (reversing the methods of determining benefits but
leaving cohabitant recovery untouched).
76. Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual
Couples and Evolving Definitions of "Family," 29 J. FsA. L. 497, 499 (1990-1991).
77. Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 136, 190 (1992).
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ceases, so should the rule itself."78 This is precisely what occurred in
the 1960s and 1970s, when the courts began to recognize a woman's
claim for loss of consortium. "So prone are the courts to cling to con-
suetudinary law, even after the reason for the custom has ceased or
become a mere memory, that it has required hundreds of years to
obtain the meed of justice for married women."79 As the courts
opened recovery to wives, precedent was not a guiding factor for
them. The courts' concern was "not with the family of the middle
ages, with its tyrannies and abuses, but with the family of today."80 If
the court looked to the family of the 1960s to extend the right of
recovery to the wife, why should the California court not look to how
society defines the current family in order to extend the right of re-
covery to those committed couples that experience loss from the tor-
tious conduct that injured one partner? "Whenever an old rule is
found unsuited to present conditions ... it should be set aside and a
rule declared which is in harmony with those conditions and meets
the demands of justice."8' Blind adherence to outdated mandates
merely perpetuates and engenders harsh and unjust results.82
A. Lozoya v. Sanchez:83 New Mexico's Novel Approach
In March 2003, New Mexico held that its old rule of loss of con-
sortium was unsuited to present conditions and merely perpetuated
harsh results.84 Ubaldo and Osbaldo Lozoya, father and son, were in-
volved in a car accident in 1999.85 They were stopped at an intersec-
tion when another car driven by Diego Sanchez hit them from
behind.8 6 As a result of this accident and another accident ten months
later, Ubaldo's previous back problems were aggravated and en-
hanced.8 7 At the time of the first accident, Ubaldo lived in a domestic
partnership with Sara Lozoya, but the two were not married.8 8 They
had lived together for thirty years, had three children together, lived
in a home they purchased together, and even shared a common last
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3510 (West 1997).
79. Bernhardt v. Perry, 208 S.W. 462, 470 (Mo. 1918) (Bond, C.J., dissenting).
80. Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227, 234 (Mich. 1960).
81. Mo. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 299 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Ark. 1957) (citation omitted).
82. See Hicks v. New Mexico, 544 P.2d 1153, 1156 (N.M. 1975).
83. 66 P.3d 948 (N.M. 2003).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 951.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 951-52.
88. Id.
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name.89 Prior to the first car accident, Ubaldo and Sara had a "happy
relationship" that involved going out dancing, visiting friends, sharing
intimacies, and making life decisions together.9 0 After the accident, in
addition to his physical injuries, Ubaldo's demeanor "changed dra-
matically;" Ubaldo became depressed, rarely leaving his bed.9 1 This
affected his relationship with Sara; they no longer socialized and their
sexual intimacies diminished.92 At the trial level, the court dismissed
Sara Lozoya's loss of consortium claim because she and Ubaldo were
not legally married at the time of the accident and therefore lacked
standing to bring such a claim.9 3
On appeal, the negligent defendant-respondent, Diego Sanchez,
relied on Elden and made five rebuttals to Lozoya's appeal: (1) a legal
status has always been a limiting factor for loss of consortium; (2) the
legal status of the parties serves to provide the courts with clear gui-
dance as to who should recover; (3) it would be unfair to allow a co-
habitant to recover a benefit of marriage without assuming the
burdens that go with marriage; (4) extending the cause of action
would institute a common law marriage; and, finally, (5) extending
the cause of action to unmarried couples would lead to an unwork-
able standard.94
The New Mexico Supreme Court refuted Sanchez's first argu-
ment by reasoning that the legal status is only concerned with estab-
lishing a close familial relationship, which the claim is protecting, and
not the legal status itself.95 Implicitly, the court emphasized that the
marriage requirement was merely a means of line-drawing. In essence,
limiting recovery to married couples was done by the courts for sim-
plicity's sake and not because the legal status confers some sort of
right or benefit upon the individual: "A person brings this claim to
recover for damage to a relational interest, not a legal interest. ' 96 The
court denied the second "line-drawing" argument as well, remarking
that "[e]ase of administration ... does not necessarily further the in-
terests of justice."9 7 Besides, a court may clearly rely on the sound
judgment of a jury to assess the quality of interpersonal relationships,
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 954.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 955 (emphasis in original).
97. Id.
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and a court is competent enough to assure that the resulting emo-
tional injury is real and is in need of compensation.98 The court dis-
agreed with Elden's reasoning that rejecting claims by cohabitants
promoted marriage by adding:
[T] he State has a continuing interest in protecting the legal inter-
est of marriage .... Allowing an unmarried partner to recover for
loss of consortium neither advances nor retracts from that interest.
It is doubtful that anyone would choose to marry simply because
they would not be allowed to bring a future loss of consortium
claim otherwise.99
The court rejected the third "benefit of marriage" argument by
reasoning that the loss of consortium claim is not a benefit of mar-
riage but is instead a method of compensation for those who have
suffered a loss to a "significant relational interest."100 Upon rejecting
the fourth "common law marriage" argument, the court emphasized
that although common law marriages were not recognized within the
state, that sort of evidence, such as mutual agreement and assumption
of duty to one another, would be "highly probative" in deciding the
closeness of the relationship between the injured partner and the
claimant.10 1 The court then rejected Sanchez's fifth and final "un-
workable standard" argument. 10 2 The court emphasized that it is fore-
seeable, given the growing number of cohabitants in society, that an
injured person might not be married but might have a significant
other who would experience loss based on their partner's injury. 0 3
The court reasoned that a standard allowing cohabitant recovery
for loss of consortium could be workable when that standard balances
such factors as duration and dependence, common contributions to
mutual living, the extent and quality of shared experience, whether or
not the individuals were members of the same household, the emo-
tional reliance on each other, and day-to-day interactions in mundane
situations. 10 4 Notably, even if the couple was legally married at the
time of the injury these factors would have to be considered in order
for a jury to properly assess damages. 10 5
98. Id.
99. Id. (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 956.
101. Id. at 956-57.
102. Id. at 957-58.
103. Id. at 957.
104. Id. (citation omitted).
105. Id.
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Additionally, the court suggested additional requirements in or-
der to alleviate the fears emphasized in Elden.10 6 First, a person may
only have one intimate familial relationship at any given time for the
purpose of loss of consortium. 10 7 Second, for unmarried couples,
their relationship must be committed and exclusive. Finally, for en-
gaged, married, or common law married couples, commitment is
presumed. 10 8
B. California Should Adopt New Mexico's Approach
It shocks the conscience when there is not a "better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past."'1 9 The problems of Elden begin to manifest when one
looks at society. California and the United States in general are alter-
ing-and in fact were altering even prior to the Elden decision-their
definitions of family, relationships, and those interests that they be-
lieve deserve protection. With the increasing growth of nontraditional
households, the term "family" has become blurred and so too have
the rights for recovery of things such as loss of consortium. 110
1. A Changing Californian Society
In recent decades, California has dramatically altered its law re-
garding many aspects concerning relationships, both married and un-
married. Not long ago, a California statute, repealed in 1973,
recognized the husband as the head of the household, with sole au-
thority to choose the place and mode of the family's living."1 Another
statute recognized the husband as the manager of community prop-
erty until it too was repealed in 1992.112 A California statute recogniz-
ing the husband as having the primary legal responsibility for child
support was also repealed in 1980.113 Even in the criminal sector inter-
ests have changed. Marital rape was not penalized in California until
106. Id. at 958.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
110. David G. Richardson, Note, Family Rights for Unmarried Couples, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 117, 117 (1993).
111. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5101 (repealed 1973).
112. See id. § 5105 (repealed 1992).
113. See id. § 196 (repealed 1992).
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legislators changed the code in 1979.114 These statutory changes illus-
trate that, as society has changed, so too have California's laws.
During this time of statutory change, unmarried couples, includ-
ing homosexual ones, gained increasing recognition as well. Courts
began to realize that a state's interest in marriage did not imply a "cor-
responding policy against nonmarital relationships," and that Califor-
nia should not stigmatize committed unmarried couples who make
reasonable decisions of sound judgment. 1 5 In 1976, for example, un-
married cohabitants were granted the ability to aggregate their earn-
ings and property in mutual agreements.1 16 Allowing such progressive
reforms toward unmarried cohabitants corresponded to population
trends reflecting a growing number of American citizens living and
coupling outside the confines of a traditionally recognized marriage.
Statistics reveal that there are a growing number of cohabiting
(unmarried and living together) opposite-sex couples in the United
States, ballooning from 523,000 in 1970 to 1.6 million in 1980, to 2.9
million in 1990, and to 4.2 million in 1998.117 Furthermore, of those
who do marry, nearly one-half result in divorce.1 18 Perhaps this grow-
ing rise in cohabitating couples and divorce reflects the growing reali-
zation that "many marriages lack the mutual support, companionship,
and like benefits that a loss of consortium claim purports to pro-
tect."119 Regardless of the reason, marriage no longer plays as central
a role in society as it did years ago, and, as a result, new forms of
family and marriage-alternatives have been formed.
Cohabitation is one type of marriage-alternative. One recent
study has shown another marriage-alternative where "growing num-
bers of same-sex couples are using public, wedding-like rituals to sol-
emnize and celebrate their intimate commitments .... ,120 The
growing affirmation of such marriage-alternatives also reflects a shift
114. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1999); People v. Hillard, 260 Cal. Rptr. 625, 627
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the statute was designed to remove the marital ex-
emption from the crime of rape).
115. Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 192 Cal. Rptr. 134, 143 (Cal. 1983)
(Broussard, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
116. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976).
117. See Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1381, 1384
(2001) (footnote omitted).
118. See Richardson, supra note 110, at 118.
119. Anne E. Simmerman, Note, The Right of a Cohabitant to Recover in Tort: Wrongful
Death, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Loss of Consortium, 32 U. LOUlSviLLEJ. FAM.
L. 531, 543 (1993-1994).
120. Kathleen E. Hull, The Cultural Power of Law and the Cultural Enactment of Legality:
The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUiRY 629, 632-33 (2003).
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in the social understanding of what benefits the community as a
whole. California's interest in a marriage is the relationship between
the couple, not the marriage license itself. Marriage is sanctimonious,
not because there is a document affixed with the seal of the county
recorder, but rather because that type of relationship encourages and
oftentimes succeeds at promoting stability among citizens, both adult
and child, and maintains a continuous social transmission from gener-
ation to generation. A state should "maximize its interest in protecting
the relationships it views as the bedrock of society by allowing recovery
for loss of consortium to cohabitants." 121
Furthermore, as California incorporated heterosexual unmarried
couples into its legal framework, it began to accept that homosexual
couples could also possess characteristics that benefit society, analo-
gous to a married couple. In 1987, ajoint task force of California sena-
tors and state assemblypersons recognized that "greater recognition is
being given to gay or lesbian life partners for what they are: family
relationships." 122 The task force determined that these homosexual
households "serve the same family functions as other family forms."
23
In 1988, a California appellate court ruled that custody rights could
not be denied to a parent based on sexual preference alone.' 24 "The
unconventional lifestyle of one parent, or the opposing moral posi-
tions of the parties," did not present the court with "an adequate basis
for restricting visitation rights."' 25 In 1991, a California appellate
court held that under the California Constitution, homosexuals were
entitled to equal protection under the law. 126
Statutorily as well, homosexuals gained more legal recognition in
roles equivalent to marital recognition. For example, the California
Legislature approved the progressive standard of allowing domestic
partners the ability to adopt the other partner's children. 127 At the
municipal level, Berkeley, Laguna Beach, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Santa Cruz, West Hollywood, Alameda County, and San Mateo County
have all enacted domestic partnership ordinances allowing for regis-
121. Kelly M. Martin, Note, Loss of Consortium: Should California Protect Cohabitants' Rela-
tional Interest?, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1467, 1486 (1985).
122. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE JOINT SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE CHANGING FAMILY, CALI-
FORNIA COUPLES: RECOGNIZING DIvERsrrY AND STRENGTHENING FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS
34 (Oct. 1988).
123. Id. at 35.
124. See Birdsall v. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289 (Cal. Ct App. 1988).
125. Id. at 291.
126. Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 654 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991).
127. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West Supp. 2003).
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tration and a multitude of rights and benefits.1 28 Additionally, many
companies including Levi Strauss, Ben and Jerry's, MCA, Greenpeace,
Lotus, Planned Parenthood, AAA, and the American Psychological As-
sociation have extended their benefit or membership plans to include
domestic partners. 129 Most recently, California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger signed a law into effect to amend and add a new sec-
tion to the family code. 130 The relevant portion of the act allows regis-
tered domestic partners the "same rights, protections, and benefits" as
well as stating that they should "be subject to the same responsibilities
... as are granted to and imposed upon spouses. 1 3 1
Californian society has clearly developed beyond the considera-
tions cited in Elden.a3 2 This changed society has created a judicial co-
nundrum concerning loss of consortium that cannot be resolved
under the Elden approach. California faced the same problem in 1974
when a wife attempted to recover for loss of consortium.133 The soci-
ety of 1974 had developed beyond the court's original considerations.
A wife was no longer considered the property of her husband and her
injuries were real. She, in society's eye, was real. The court, accord-
ingly, allowed recovery.' 34 Now, California sits in a similar predica-
ment. Society has changed. Committed couples are increasingly
recognized as legitimate societal units. They experience real injury re-
gardless of a marriage license. Further, homosexual couples can be
just as committed as married couples. Registering as a domestic part-
ner or getting a legal license for marriage means nothing in the realm
128. See Richardson, supra note 110, 122 (citing Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish,
Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1188-90 (1992)).
129. See Richardson, supra note 110, 123-24.
130. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West Supp. 2004) (effective Jan. 1, 2005).
131. Id. Though this act has been signed into law, there is confusion as to its imple-
mentation and how it relates to California's definition of marriage. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5
(West Supp. 2003) (stating that as of March 8, 2000 "[o]nly marriage between a man or a
woman is valid and recognized in California"). Regardless of CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5, Cali-
fornia would still preclude loss of consortium recovery from committed, unmarried
straight couples and committed, unregistered homosexual couples. This would occur be-
cause, with Elden still requiring marriage and with this new law requiring domestic registra-
tion to claim a tort dependent on marriage, unmarried heterosexual couples and
unregistered homosexual couples would have no right to recovery. Though a growing
number of cities have issued same sex marriage licenses, the proceeding backlash and their
forcible cessation along with the confusion of this new law tend to show that even those
homosexuals with registration status may not be able to recover. Therefore, the require-
ment itself must be changed.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
133. See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974).
134. See id. at 686.
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of consortium. In society's eye, these couples are real. Their injuries,
too, are real-yet the law prohibits their recovery.
2. A Changing Supreme Court
S6cietal shifts appear to reach beyond just California. One com-
mentator on the subject suggests that laws prohibiting recovery for
loss of consortium for unmarried cohabitants and homosexual
couples could lie in the fact that the United States Supreme Court
had "not yet recognized a constitutionally-protected freedom to form
intimate associations beyond the traditional relationships."'135 The
United States Supreme Court destroyed this premise in June 2003.
Texas police officers arrested Tyron Garner and John Geddes Law-
rence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. 13 6 The two were
not arrested for weapons violations, but rather for engaging in private
consensual sex acts, in violation of a Texas sodomy statute. 13 7 The Su-
preme Court overturned the convictions by overruling prior case law
and invalidating the sodomy statute. 138 The critical aspect of this case,
as it relates to the topic of relational torts, is found in the Court's
dicta. It reasoned that homosexuals have the liberty to express them-
selves in personal bonds of intimate conduct with one another. 13 9
Homosexuals have autonomy to make intimate and personal choices,
central to dignity and liberty.140 The Court came to these conclusions
to conform to "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex."'141
All too often the ability to recover for loss of consortium is mis-
construed as a reward for marriage. 142 Only married couples, some
argue, should recover for loss of consortium as a reward for actually
committing to the other partner and taking up the "adult responsibil-
ity" of marriage. This has never been a consideration courts have
taken seriously. 143 There is something deeper at the heart of the
135. BarbaraJ. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through Liti-
gation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 93, 100 (2000).
136. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003).
137. Id. at 563.
138. Id. at 578.
139. See id. at 566-68.
140. Id. at 574.
141. Id. at 572. It should be noted that history and tradition were helpful but ultimately
not conclusive in the Court's inquiry.
142. Diego Sanchez attempted this argument in a New Mexico case. See Lozoya v.
Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 956 (N.M. 2003).
143. See id. at 956.
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claim: the relationship. 144 It may be argued that Lawrence v. Texas is
only significant because it prohibits the criminalization of sodomy by
states.145 But it also stands for something else: in order to prohibit
such criminalization, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that adults are free to create personal and intimate consensual rela-
tionships with minimal government interference.' 46 Both decriminal-
izing sodomy and recognizing adult intimacy point to more
fundamental aspects of honoring relationships between two con-
senting adults. Therefore, the loss of consortium claim is not a reward
at all but rather a recognition of the right to form intimate relation-
ships by compensating the individual whose relationship is injured by
the tortious conduct of another.
A tort claim purporting to protect the underlying relational inter-
est should thereby extend to all couples, whether married or not. This
argument receives additional support in California, where unmarried
people may freely cohabitate and the right to privacy encompasses the
right to choose the people with whom one lives. 147 If one has the right
to openly create and maintain the relationship, why should courts
continue to distinguish relationships in relational tort claims?
3. The Morality Issue with Loss of Consortium
Yet with all these social changes, only New Mexico allows an un-
married cohabitant to maintain a loss of consortium claim. 148 Further-
more, not a single state has allowed the cause of action to proceed by
a same-sex partner. 149 In California, "delineating the extent of a
tortfeasor's responsibility ... [requires courts to] locate the line be-
tween liability and non-liability at some point, a decision which is es-
sentially political.' °5 0 Since the line-drawing feature is one of policy,
politics, and morality, many quickly and rashly assume that determina-
tions to exclude non-traditional couples are primarily based on the
moral criticisms of courts. With nothing more, it would almost seem
plausible to argue that the courts do not recognize unmarried hetero-
sexual couples because they are "living in sin" or beyond the tradi-
144. Id.
145. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
146. Id. at 567-68.
147. See Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380-81 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980).
148. See Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, 3 P.3d 916, 923 (Alaska 2000).
149. John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CAPDozo L.
REv. 1119, 1141 (1999) (footnote omitted).
150. Suter v. Leonard, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
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tional mores of society. Furthermore, given the nature and religious
structure of a certain segment of American society, courts are even
more likely not to recognize homosexual couples.
But such is not the situation for Californian loss of consortium
jurisprudence. Although morality and politics, whether wisely or un-
wisely, may at times be used in adjudication of common law claims,
the moral and political lines of reasoning proffered by the California
court in choosing to extend or deny recovery to wives, parents, chil-
dren, and cohabitants have been relatively limited. The California
courts have circumscribed themselves to certain restricted lines of rea-
soning. When extending recovery to wives, the court pointed to
changing social roles and the need to be equitable. 15 1 The court
looked to the easy determination of compensation by juries, the need
to prevent limitless liability, and the safeguards implemented through
jury instructions. 152 The court has always considered as the basis for
denying recovery the overextending of liability and the need to tightly
curtail the claim, as based on the difficulty of assessing emotional, sex-
ual, and financial commitment. 153 Nowhere in these cases will one
find moral condemnation of particular relationships stated as a reason
for denying the extension of the claim. In fact, in Elden the California
Supreme Court specifically stated that such moral condemnation
played no role in its reasoning and consideration in denying cohabi-
tant recovery: "[O]ur determination here is not based on a value judg-
ment regarding the morality of unmarried cohabitation
relationships."1 54 In other areas of cohabitant recognition, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court followed similar reasoning:
The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in re-
gard to cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on
alleged moral considerations that have apparently been so widely
abandoned by so many. Lest we be misunderstood, however, we
take this occasion to point out that the structure of society itself
largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and nothing we
have said in this opinion should be taken to derogate from that
institution. The joining of the man and woman in marriage is at
once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling rela-
tionship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime.1 55
151. See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1974).
152. See id. at 680-85.
153. See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 589 (Cal. 1988); Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
563 P.2d 858, 860-65 (Cal. 1977).
154. Elden, 758 P.2d at 590.
155. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).
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Since moral condemnation has not been expounded as legal rea-
soning for extending or denying recovery in loss of consortium claims,
and since the courts refuse to make moral judgments against mar-
riage-alternatives, supporters of a limited loss of consortium claims
need not worry about a judge importing her own values through the
extension of the claim. This is because the courts have limited them-
selves to a relatively formal structure of considerations, none of which
include moral disapproval of unmarried or homosexual couples. The
morality involved in condemning such relationships should, there-
fore, not play a role in determining whether or not a legal require-
ment for marriage is valid.
4. Why Marriage Is an Arbitrary Line
The arbitrary line that has been drawn in allowing marriage to be
the only deciding factor for bringing suit fails to compensate for the
actual interest at stake in loss of consortium claims. Few would disa-
gree that Sara Lozoya should recover for her loss. Her relationship
was akin to a thirty-year marriage, but it was not a per se marriage in
the eyes of the law, so loss of consortium claims must be protecting
something more than marriage. Similarly, a gay couple may have a
thirty-year relationship, but still fail to recover for an identical action
in California. This circumstance is unequal and in dire need of revi-
sion. The line at marriage is hastily drawn. 156 A relational interest does
not solely flow from a marriage license-it flows from commitment.
Nonmarital unions may possess the attributes of a marriage and,
if committed, may be just as vital to society, if not more vital, as com-
pared to an abusive or unwanted marriage. Married couples, just like
all other unmarried couples, exist in a gamut of differing levels of
emotional commitment. Even Lozoya failed to recognize this spectrum
when it reasoned that evidence of a marriage or an engagement
would create a presumption of commitment. 157 A married, uncommit-
ted couple would have the possibility of recovering a consortium claim
while a committed, unmarried couple would never even be given the
opportunity. This is a perversion of justice and a perversion of what
loss of consortium is all about-the real0oss of a relational interest.
The standard should be evaluated on a case-by-case determination of
commitment. Likewise, marriage is not harmed if unmarried hetero-
sexual or homosexual couples recover. To argue that such recovery
156. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376 (N.J. 1994).
157. See Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 958 (N.M. 2003).
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would harm the institution of marriage is counterintuitive. People do
not get married in order to secure the elements to bring a claim for
loss of consortium; so perhaps there is a post facto protection of some
social "good" that is occurring with this tort. Even with such protec-
tion, could it not be argued that adult coupling in almost any instance
of commitment is a social "good" deserving of recovery?
To say that allowing a member of an unmarried couple to recover
would create a great intrusion into private lives is also counterintui-
tive. That individual decides to bring the claim. If he is willing to bring
the claim, he is willing to undergo a peek into his and his partner's
private life. This intrusion also occurs with married couples. Moreo-
ver, regardless of the label given to the relationship, the jury will al-
ways have to determine damage awards based on the personal
interactions in each individual claim, married or unmarried. 158 In do-
ing so, the jury concerns itself with the dynamics of the relationship to
determine what exactly must be compensated. The court in Elden
failed to recognize the true competency of the jury. Juries are intelli-
gent; it is "not beyond the jury's ken" to assess relationships and to
adequately compensate for real emotional injury.159 The California
Supreme Court has long recognized the jury's capabilities to do so.
Although compensation for personal injury is " [o] ne of the most diffi-
cult tasks imposed upon a jury,"160 the court maintained "faith in the
ability of the jury to exercise sound judgment in fixing compensa-
tion."16 1 "[I3nquiry into the quality and intimacy of a relationship" in
the assessment of a loss of consortium claim "breaks no new
ground."1 62 To allow only married couples to recover based on evi-
dence of a marriage license would allow a tortfeasor to execute harm
upon non-licensed couples without any responsibility, which clearly is
inconsistent with tort principles. 63 Imagine if Diego Sanchez had no
obligation to compensate Sara Lozoya for her loss.
"The responsibility of the legal system is to recognize today's so-
cial context."' 64 California has a responsibility to its citizens to provide
158. See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378-79.
159. Id. at 378. 0
160. Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d 673, 675 (Cal. 1966).
161. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 823 (Cal. 1980).
162. Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.H. 2003).
163. Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law-Part V. Same Sex Couples
and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1622 (1989) (recognizing that extending loss of con-
sortium claims to same sex couples is consistent with the tort principle of deterrence).
164. Simmerman, supra note 119, at 541.
[Vol. 39
recovery for loss of consortium to committed, stable couples, regard-
less of their marital or domestic partnership status.
5. A Californian Solution
California needs a workable solution for loss of consortium in this
changed society. The California Supreme Court refuses to accept un-
workable standards that "will clog our trial courts with unnecessary
hearings, discourage the settlement of legitimate claims, and severely
strain the resources of the parties and the trial and appellate courts of
this state." 165 But California will have a workable standard if it recog-
nizes society's view of relationships166 and follows New Mexico's con-
siderations of duration, dependence, mutual living in the same
household, shared experience, emotional reliance, and day-to-day in-
teractions in ordinary living situations.167 California should also apply
New Mexico's limit of one intimate relationship at a time. 168 With
such a standard, the court could continue to protect those individuals,
who after many years of companionship, have been injured, while still
precluding those romantics who claim commitment after only a few
weeks of courtship or dating.
California's standard should deviate from New Mexico's standard
of presuming commitment for married couples. The California stan-
dard must allow loss of consortium recovery only to committed
couples, both homosexual and heterosexual, whether married or un-
married. It should not assume that a marriage license or registration
presumes commitment. The court should, on a case-by-case basis, look
to the factors of Loyoza to determine if the relationship, whether mar-
ried or unmarried, resembles what the cause of action is attempting to
remedy. Such a standard would certainly prohibit the overextension
of liability in allowing children, parents, close roommates, and other
relatives or friends from recovery. To completely prohibit such an
overextension, the court could add a requirement for some degree of
sexual intimacy.
This combination of factors produces an appropriate response to
California's problem. Flexibility and fairness should guide the courts
when extending loss of consortium to marriage alternatives. It is con-
ceded that there is a functional compulsion for human beings to bond
165. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 698 P.2d 159, 168 (Cal. 1985) (Bird,
C.J., dissenting).
166. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-68 (2003).
167. See Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 957 (N.M. 2003).
168. See id. at 958.
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together as intimate couples to share life's joys and its burdens. It is
also conceded that with this compulsion and union there are benefits
and responsibilities. The loss of consortium claim and its extension to
wives revealed that it was a benefit to the significant and mature bond-
ing of a relationship. If a couple has chosen to take on the responsibil-
ities of bonding together as a living unit, why then should the court
deny them a benefit?
Further, this proposed case-by-case standard would not clog the
court system because the consortium claim is typically attached to the
suit of the injured partner and that suit would nonetheless require the
attention of the court.169 Nor would liability be overextended: the
above guidelines create an easily identifiable "discrete class of poten-
tial plaintiffs"'170 and California jury instructions are already specifi-
cally given to prevent double recovery in loss of consortium claims.
17 1
Under this approach, not just anyone may claim a loss of consor-
tium-only those individuals with a real relational interest within a
committed and stable relationship as determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis. From there, the jury may determine the degree of the couple's
commitment, and how much, if any, the compensation for the loss of
consortium should be.
Conclusion
California is a progressive state that at one point led the way in
tort development and reformation, but has now grown sluggish. Jus-
tice Mosk once recognized the California Supreme Court as a court
willing to take new and liberal positions in the area of tort law: "[If a]
crowd is marching in the wrong direction, we have not heretofore hes-
itated to break ranks.... I need not list the many instances in which
this court has initiated new trends in the law of personal torts ... to
previously neglected classes of accident victims."'1 72 It is time that Cali-
fornia recognize the changed societal expectations of family and rela-
tionships and adopt a contemporary standard for loss of consortium
claims that looks to the relationship between the two individuals and
169. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 370 (West 2004); 1 NANCY HERSH & WARD SMITH, CALI-
FORNIA CPIVL PRACTICE: TORTS § 10:8 (1992) (stating thatjoinder of loss of consortium to
an underlying claim, although not mandatory, is highly encouraged under the California
statutory scheme).
170. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377 (N.J. 1994).
171. See CIVIL COMM. ON CAL. JURY INSTURCTIONS, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
BAJI-CIVIL 14.40 (9th ed. 2002); 1 HERSH & SMITH, supra note 169.
172. Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 869 (Cal. 1977) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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not the official stamp of approval that the couple may have received at
some time in the past.
"As our society has progressed, the term 'loss of consortium' has
been redefined to recognize and meet current social and judicial real-
ities." 173 It was redefined to include wives. Now the time has come for
it to include committed, unmarried heterosexual and homosexual
couples. Unfortunately, couples with similarly situated levels of com-
mitment and codependence are not treated similarly in the California
court system. Such differences ignore the fact that deep relational in-
terests are not dependent on official documents. It ignores that the
loss of consortium claim protects relationships that sustain real injury.
When a court denies this recovery to an unmarried heterosexual or
homosexual couple, it clearly states that the unmarried couple is not
worthy of recognition and that their relationship is not part of the
societal interest. Lozoya serves as an excellent guidepost for loss of con-
sortium recovery that would ensure that only individuals in committed
relationships, who are appropriately harmed, are allowed to recover.
California can simply no longer rely on Elden. Elden should be
replaced with a standard that allows all committed couples to recover.
Such "fundamental questions ... await a better answer than that we
do as our fathers have done."'
' 74
173. Osborne, supra note 3, at 179.
174. Holmes, supra note 109, at 470.
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